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Abstract
Belief fusion, instead of AGM belief revision, was rst proposed to solve the problem
of inconsistency, that arise from repetitive application of the operation when agents'
knowledge were amalgamated. However in the theory, all the sources must be totally
ordered and thus applicable area is quite restrictive. In this paper, we realize the
belief fusion of multiple agents for partially ordered sources. When we consider
such a partial ranking over sources, there is no need to restrict that each agent has
total preorders over possible worlds. The preferential model allows each agent to
have strict partial orders over possible worlds. Especially, such an order is called
a preferential relation, that prescribes a world is more plausible than the other.
We introduce an operation which combines multiple preferential relations of agents.
In addition, we show that our operation can properly include the ordinary belief
fusion.
1 Introduction
In amalgamation of beliefs in multiple agents, the problem is the complicated
order of reliability. Belief fusion, instead of AGM belief revision [1,2], was
rst proposed by Maynard-Reid II and Shoham [6], to ensure the consistency,
as follows. Suppose each agent has a total preorder on possible worlds, based
on the semantic work (cf. [3,4]). This order can be rened with the order of
the other agent, as `
A
< 
B
'; where 
A
is the order of possible worlds of
Agent A, that is more reliable than that of Agent B, and the result of `< '
is the rened order. However, the iterated aggregation (
A
< 
C
)< 
B
is
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spurious in case 
C
is more reliable than both of 
A
and 
B
. In order to
solve this problem, they regarded agents as sources, between which there is a
total credibility ranking, and considered that each source has a belief state, a
total preorder over worlds.
Let us consider the following piece of detective story.
\A criminal is said to be one of the four: P , Q, R, and S. Two inspectors
A and B had information that there are ngerprints of them except for S
at the crime scene (s
1
). Moreover, A knew that an old man uttered that
Q remained at the neighborhood of the scene, but he had no opinion about
P and R (s
2
). B heard a story that a child witnessed that P bought the
weapon (s
3
). The investigation headquarter wants to amalgamate all these
information, considering the reliability of each source. s
1
is more credible
than s
2
and s
3
, but s
2
is incomparable with s
3
. Who should the police
investigate rst?"
The problem is how we put the plausibility order in possible worlds, in each
of which the criminal is dierent. The credibility order in two agents A and
B is not worth considering, because the situation is already regarded as the
result of amalgamation of three primitive agents, called sources s
i
(i = 1; 2; 3).
However, we cannot directly apply the belief fusion to this case because sources
are only partially ordered.
We give another example to show that the totality of the ranking of sources
is too strong to hypothesize. Suppose that two TV directors have dierent
opinions about a program, and their ranking is the same. Each opinion cannot
be regarded as only an individual opinion, because it aects behaviors of
assistants, cameramans, performers, and so on. That is, the opposition of
two directors changes relations of commitments in their personnel. As we will
discuss, we simply consider these various relations as chains. So, we will deal
with the partiality of the ranking of sources.
When we consider such a partial ranking over sources, there is no need to
restrict that each agent has total preorders over possible worlds. The preferen-
tial model allows each agent to have strict partial orders over possible worlds,
known as [8,5,7], and so on. Especially, such an order is called a preferential
relation, that prescribes a world is more plausible than the other. When we
declare an inference relation j , meaning \If  then naturally ," for any
minimal world which satises , it also satises .
We introduce an operation which combines multiple preferential relations
of agents, in the similar way of the fusion of belief state, naming fusion of
preferential relations. Note again that preferential relations are strict partial
orders whereas belief states are total preorders. Naturally, the operation would
become more complicated than the belief fusion. However, by the proper
translation from belief states to preferential relations, we will show that our
framework can simulate the belief fusion.
In this paper, we introduce the renement operator for preferential rela-
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tions in Section 2; although the same operator was mentioned rather easily
in [6], our denition of the renement includes various problems, and thus we
spare one section for the explanation. In Section 3, we introduce the pedigreed
preferential relation and construct the fusion of pedigreed preferential models.
In Section 4, we show that our formalism can properly include the ordinary
belief fusion. Finally in Section 5, we summarize our contribution and discuss
various issues of our formalization.
2 Renement
We assume a language L. A world w gives an interpretation over L. We
denote the set of worlds as W. We use r as an arbitrary relation over W,
but it usually means an ordering. If (w
a
; w
b
) satises r, we denote w
a
rw
b
or
(w
a
; w
b
) 2 r, interchangeably. Tr(r) means the transitive closure of r. Let us
dene anonymous preferential relations.
Denition 2.1 An (anonymous) preferential relation r (over W) is a strict
partial order over W.
That is to say, a preferential relation is an anti-reexive and transitive
relation over W. When (w
a
; w
b
) is neither w
a
rw
b
nor w
b
rw
a
, we denote it by
w
a
 w
b
. We also denote the set of preferential relations by P.
We will dene the fusion operator which accepts two preferential relations
and produces another, but in order for the operator to be meaningful, it
will require an additional input which concerns the reliability. At rst, we
resolve conicts by declaring that one agent (A) is more credible than the other
(B) and A's judgment dominates B's. We consider the following tentative
denition of renement.
Suppose r
A
; r
B
2 P. The renement of r
A
by r
B
is
r
A
^
 r
B
= f(w
a
; w
b
) : w
a
r
A
w
b
_ (w
a

A
w
b
^ w
a
r
B
w
b
)g.
In other words, to construct the fused relation, whenever the more credible
agent prefers one world to another, we side with this preference. In case the
most credible agent has no preference, we follow the ranking of the less credible
agent. However, this denition has problems, because the produced relation
may not be a preferential relation. At rst, a produced relation may not be
transitive. In the left of Figure 1, w
3
r
A
w
2
and w
2
r
B
w
1
, but (w
3
; w
1
) =2 r
A
^
 r
B
by the denition. Secondly, even if a produced relation would be transitively
closed, the relation might not be anti-reexive. See the right of Figure 1 where
(w
1
; w
1
) 2 Tr(r
A
^
 r
B
) is not anti-reexive.
Thus, we revise the denition of the renement so as to satisfy the transi-
tivity and the anti-reexivity, with a xed-point equation. We write a nite
number of repetitions of the relation r as r

.
Denition 2.2 Suppose r
A
; r
B
2 P. A relation over possible worlds, denoted
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w1
w2
w3
w1
w2
w3
=
A B
w1
w2
w3
A B
w1
w2
w3
=
A B
w1
A B
w2
w1
w3
w2
w3
w1
Fig. 1. Example: the produced relation is neither transitive nor anti-reexive.
w1
w2
w3
A B
w2
w1
w3 w1
w3 w1
or
w2
w2 w3
=
A B
p
p
Fig. 2. Example : there are two renements of r
A
by r
B
.
by r
A

p
r
B
, is a primitive renement of r
A
by r
B
i
r
A

p
r
B
= r
A
[ f(w
a
; w
b
) : w
a

A
w
b
^ w
a
r
B
w
b
^8w(w[r
A

p
r
B
]

w
b
! w 6= w
b
)g:
Denition 2.3 Suppose r
A
; r
B
2 P. A relation over possible worlds, denoted
by r
A
 r
B
, is a renement of r
A
by r
B
i
Tr(r
A

p
r
B
) = r
A
 r
B
:
Note that there can be multiple renements of r
A
by r
B
. For example
in Figure 2, two relations satisfy the condition of 2.2 and thus there are two
renements of r
A
by r
B
by 2.3. Therefore, we need a rationale to decide a
unique result of fusion. We propose that the result is the common relations
in those multiple candidates.
Denition 2.4 Suppose r
A
; r
B
2 P and RF (r
A
; r
B
) is the set of all of rene-
ments of r
A
by r
B
. The cautious renement of r
A
by r
B
is
r
A
 r
B
= \RF (r
A
; r
B
):
The cautious renement is well-dened.
Proposition 2.5 If r
A
; r
B
2 P, then r
A
 r
B
2 P.
Proof. It suÆces that we show r
A
 r
B
is a strict partial order over W.
Transitivity is straightforward. Anti-reexivity is shown by contradiction.
If we suppose there is w 2 W such that w[r
A
 r
B
]w, then there exists
w[r
A

p
r
B
]

w, and it contradicts 2.1. 2
Obviously, r
A
 r
A
 r
B
.
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3 Fusion of Preferential Relations
Because ` ' is not a symmetric operator, we encounter the same problem as
we mentioned at the top of Section 1 when we iteratively apply the operator.
Consider r
A
, r
B
, and r
C
with increasing order of dominance (r
A
, dominated
by r
B
, both by r
C
). Presumably, the above denition would give meaningful
interpretation to (r
A
 r
B
) r
C
, since all the information in r
C
dominates all
the information in r
A
 r
B
. However in case (r
A
 r
C
) r
B
, it would seem that
some of the information in r
A
 r
C
dominates the information in r
B
(because
it originated from r
C
) and some is dominated by it (because it originated from
r
A
).
In the similar way to [6], we introduce pedigree. The sources can be thought
of as primitive agents with xed preferential relations, and an agent's pedigreed
preferential relation is simply the amalgamation of all these opinions, each of
which is annotated by its origin or pedigree. In this paper, we assume that the
agent places a strict credibility ranking on the sources, but we do not assume
that the ranking is total as the previous study.
We will use S to denote the nite set of all of sources. Each source has a
preferential model from P. To distinguish between agent and source preferen-
tial relations, we will use r
s
to denote the preferential relation of source s 2 S.
We now dene pedigreed preferential relations.
Denition 3.1 Given a set of sources S  S the pedigreed preferential rela-
tion induced by S is a function  :W W ! 2
S
such that (w
a
; w
b
) = fs 2
S : w
a
r
s
w
b
g.
We assume a strict partial ranking w on S and thus, a set of sources
induces a unique . We interpret s
1
w s
2
as \s
1
is at least as credible as s
2
."
Before we dene the ordering induced by , we dene the set of maximal
chains of S.
Denition 3.2 The set of the maximal chains of S is
MC(S) = fS
mc
 S : S
mc
is a chain of S and
for any chain S
c
of S; S
mc
 S
c
implies S
c
= S
mc
g:
Our interest in the section is to show that a standard (anonymous) pref-
erential relation is induced by a pedigreed preferential relation. However, the
partiality in the order complicates the proof. Therefore, we plan the following
strategy; (i) we divide the partial ranking over resources to maximal chains,
(ii) construct an order over possible worlds on each maximal chain, and (iii)
calculate the intersection of all of the orders over possible worlds. Using this
strategy, we deal with an ranking over maximal chains. Because of the par-
tiality of preferential model of each source, the ordering process consists of
the following multiple steps.
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Denition 3.3 Let S  S, and S
mc
= fs
1
; :::; s
N
g 2 MC(S) such that
s
i
w s
i+1
for all 1  i  N . The ordering induced by  and S
mc
is
r
;S
mc
= Order
N
(; S
mc
):
At this point,
(i) Order
n
(; S
mc
) = \GO
n
(; S
mc
),
(ii) GO
n
(; S
mc
) is the set of all of Tr(GenOrder
n
(; S
mc
)), and
(iii) GenOrder
n
(; S
mc
)
=
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
if n = 1;
f(w
a
; w
b
) : s
1
2 (w
a
; w
b
)g
otherwise(n > 1);
Order
n 1
(; S
mc
)[
f(w
a
; w
b
) : (w
a
; w
b
) =2 Order
n 1
(; S
mc
)^
(w
b
; w
a
) =2 Order
n 1
(; S
mc
)^
s
n
2 (w
a
; w
b
)^
8w((w;w
b
) 2 GenOrder
n
(; S
mc
)

! w 6= w
b
)g:
Finally, we dene the ordering induced by a pedigreed preferential relation.
Denition 3.4 The ordering induced by  is
r

= f(w
a
; w
b
) : 8S
mc
2 MC(S); w
a
r
;S
mc
w
b
g:
With the above denitions, we can show  induces a standard (anonymous)
preferential relation.
Proposition 3.5 The ordering induced by a pedigreed preferential relation is
in P.
Proof. Given a pedigreed preferential relation , it suÆces that we show that
for all S
mc
2 MC(S), r
;S
mc
is a strict partial order over W. The proof is
similar to Proposition 2.5. 2
For the proof of Proposition 4.14, we show the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6 Let S  S, and S
mc
= fs
1
; :::; s
N
g 2 MC(S) such that s
i
w s
i+1
for all 1  i < N . If r
;S
mc
is the ordering induced by the pedigreed preferential
relations induced by S, and S
mc
, then
r
;S
mc
=
8
<
:
r
s
1
if N = 1
((r
s
1
 r
s
2
) ::: r
s
N
) otherwise(i:e:; N > 1)
:
183
Y.Suzuki and S.Tojo
Proof. We show this by induction. If N = 1, then Order
1
(; S
mc
) = r
s
1
is
obvious. Suppose Order
n 1
(; S
mc
) = ((r
s
1
 r
s
2
) ::: r
s
n
 1
). If we want to
show Order
n
(; S
mc
) = ((r
s
1
 r
s
2
) ::: r
s
n
), then it suÆces to show that r is a
primitive renement of ((r
s
1
 r
s
2
) ::: r
s
n
 1
) by r
s
n
i r is aGenOrder
n
(; S
mc
).
That is,
r = ((r
s
1
 r
s
2
) ::: r
s
n
 1
)[
f(w
a
; w
b
) : (w
a
; w
b
) =2 ((r
s
1
 r
s
2
) ::: r
s
n
 1
)
^(w
b
; w
a
) =2 ((r
s
1
 r
s
2
) ::: r
s
n
 1
)^
w
a
r
s
n
w
b
^ 8w(wr

w
b
)! w 6= w
b
)g
(By Denition 2.2.
r is a primitive renement of ((r
s
1
 r
s
2
) ::: r
s
n
 1
) by r
s
n
.)
= Order
n 1
(; S
mc
)[
f(w
a
; w
b
) : (w
a
; w
b
) =2 Order
n 1
(; S
mc
) ^ (w
b
; w
a
) =2 Order
n 1
(; S
mc
)^
s
n
2 (w
a
; w
b
) ^ 8w(wr

w
b
)! w 6= w
b
)g:
(By induction, Order
n 1
(; S
mc
) = ((r
s
1
 r
s
2
) ::: r
s
n
 1
).
It follows that r is a GenOrder
n
(; S
mc
).)
2
If we can compute a fused pedigreed preferential relation, we can also
compute a fused standard preferential relation with it.
Denition 3.7 Let 
1
and 
2
be the pedigreed preferential relation induced
by sets of sources S
1
and S
2
, respectively. The fusion of 
1
and 
2
, denoted

1
5 
2
, is the pedigreed preferential relation induced by S
1
[ S
2
.
Obviously, the set of pedigreed preferential relations is closed under 5.
The following property is also immediate.
Proposition 3.8 If 
1
and 
2
be the pedigreed preferential relation induced
by sets of sources S
1
and S
2
, respectively, then
(
1
5 
2
)(w
a
; w
b
) = 
1
(w
a
; w
b
) [ 
2
(w
a
; w
b
):
Proof. Straightforward. 2
Obviously, a set of pedigreed preferential relations that is closed under
5, and they form a semi-lattice, i.e., 5 is idempotent, commutative, and
associative. Note that the ordering induced by a pedigreed preferential relation
may be empty. For example in Figure 3, let s
1
w s
2
, but s
1
6w s
3
, s
3
6w s
1
,
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w3
A C
w1
w2
w3
w2
w1
w1
w3
B
w2
Fig. 3. Example : the ordering induced by the pedigreed preferential relation is
empty.
s
2
6w s
3
, and s
3
6w s
2
, where agent A is assigned to s
1
, B is assigned to s
2
, and
C is assigned to s
3
. Then the ordering induced by a pedigreed preferential
relation induced by the set of sources is empty.
We need to show what kind of pedigreed preferential relation induces the
nonempty ordering. We dene the maximally-ordered set of sources.
Denition 3.9 Let S  S. S is maximally-ordered i S has a maximal
source s
m
.
Proposition 3.10 If S is maximally-ordered, and the ordering induced by the
pedigreed preferential model induced by S is r

, then r
s
m
 r

.
Proof. Straightforward. 2
Therefore, an ordering which is induced by a pedigreed preferential relation
is nonempty, when its maximal source's ordering is nonempty.
4 Mapping from Belief Fusion to Fusion of Preferential
Relations
In this section, we show the connection between fusion of preferential relations,
and the belief fusion.
Denition 4.1 An (anonymous) belief state  (over W) is a total pre-order
over W.
Suppose B is the set of belief states,  is the asymmetric restriction of a
belief state , and  is the symmetric restriction of it.
Denition 4.2 Suppose 
A
;
B
2 B. The renement for belief states of 
A
by 
B
is 
A
< 
B
= f(w
a
; w
b
) : w
a

A
w
b
_ (w
a

A
w
b
^ w
a
6
B
w
b
)g.
Then the renement for belief states is a well-dened operation:
Proposition 4.3 If 
A
;
B
2 B, then 
A
< 
B
2 B.
Can we show any relation between our renement and the renement for
belief states? Before we discuss it, we show a proper translation from a belief
state to a preferential relation. The translation is dened as follows:
185
Y.Suzuki and S.Tojo
Denition 4.4 Suppose 2 B. The translated relation of  is trans() =
f(w
a
; w
b
) : w
a
 w
b
g.
Proposition 4.5 If 2 B, then trans() 2 P.
Proof. Anti-reexivity is trivial. Transitivity is shown by contradiction. 2
It is easy to show that trans() is an injection from B to P, and then, if
T is the set of translated relations of belief states, then T  P and trans()
is a bijection from B to T .
We can use the cautious renement operator for translated relations of
belief states as the renement operator for belief states as follows:
Proposition 4.6 Suppose 
A
and 
B
2 B. Then trans(
A
< 
B
) = trans(
A
) trans(
B
).
Proof. Suppose = trans(
A
< 
B
). It suÆces to show that (i) trans(
) = trans(
A
)
p
trans(
B
), and (ii) trans() is the only renement of
trans(
A
) by trans(
B
). At rst, we use
trans() = trans(
A
)[
f(w
a
; w
b
) : (w
a
; w
b
) =2 trans(
A
)^
(w
b
; w
a
) =2 trans(
A
)^
(w
a
; w
b
) 2 trans(
B
)g
by Denition 4.2, and
trans(
A
)
p
trans(
B
)
= trans(
A
)[
f(w
a
; w
b
) : (w
a
; w
b
) =2 trans(
A
)^
(w
b
; w
a
) =2 trans(
A
)^
(w
a
; w
b
) 2 trans(
B
)^
8w((w;w
b
) 2 [trans(
A
) trans(
B
)]

! w 6= w
b
)g;
by Denition 2.2, and show trans()  trans(
A
)
p
trans(
B
) and
trans()  trans(
A
)
p
trans(
B
). `' is trivial. `' is shown by contra-
diction. Finally, we assume that r is a renement of trans(
A
) by trans(
B
),
and also show r  trans() and r  trans(). 2
Therefore, trans is isomorphism w.r.t the renement operator from B to
T .
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We can translate not only renement; a pedigreed belief state can also be
translated to a pedigreed preferential relation. In the following denition,

s
denote the belief state of source s 2 S, and <
s
denote its asymmetric
restriction.
Denition 4.7 Given a set of sources S  S, the pedigreed belief state
induced by S is a function 	 : W W ! 2
S
such that 	(w
a
; w
b
) = fs 2 S :
w
a
<
s
w
b
g.
Denition 4.8 Given a set of sources S  S, the pedigreed translated rela-
tion of 	 is a function 	
trans
:W W ! 2
S
such that 	
trans
(w
a
; w
b
) = fs 2
S : w
a
trans(
s
)w
b
g.
Proposition 4.9 Given a set of sources S  S and w
a
; w
b
2 W,
	
trans
(w
a
; w
b
) = 	(w
a
; w
b
)
Proof. Straightforward. 2
Obviously, a pedigreed translated relation is a pedigreed preferential rela-
tion. We can also show the connection between the ordering induced by the
dominating belief state of a pedigreed belief state and the ordering induced
by a pedigreed translated relation; however, in which case, we need to restrict
a ranking w on S to be total.
We denote by s
0
the \agnostic" source, that is, a source such that 
s
0
is
a complete relation, and we will assume that fs
0
g is the least credible source.
Denition 4.10 Suppose that w on S is restricted to be total. Given a
pedigreed belief state 	, the dominating belief state of 	 is the function
	
w
:W W ! S such that 	
w
(w
a
; w
b
) = max(	(w
a
; w
b
) [ fs
0
g).
Denition 4.11 Suppose that w on S is restricted to be total. The ordering
induced 	
w
is the relation  W W such that w
a
 w
b
i 	
w
(w
a
; w
b
) v
	
w
(w
b
; w
a
).
Then, 	
w
induces a standard (anonymous) belief state:
Proposition 4.12 The ordering induced by a dominating belief state is in B.
Proposition 4.12 is deduced by the following lemma:
Lemma 4.13 Suppose that w onS is restricted to be total. Let S = fs
1
; :::; s
N
g 
S such that s
i
w s
i+1
for all 1  i < N . If  is the ordering induced by the
dominating belief state of the pedigreed belief states induced by S, then
=
8
<
:

s
1
if N = 1
((
s
1
< 
s
2
)< ::: 
s
N
) otherwise(i:e:; N > 1)
:
We show the following proposition:
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Proposition 4.14 Suppose that w on S is restricted to be total. If  is the
ordering induced by the dominating belief state of the pedigreed belief states
induced by S, trans() is the ordering induced by the pedigreed preferential
relations induced by S.
Proof. It is obvious by the Denition 3.2 and 3.4, Proposition 4.6, and Lemma
3.6 and 4.13. 2
Finally, we show the relation between our fusion operator and the ordinary
belief fusion.
Denition 4.15 Let 	
1
and 	
2
be the pedigreed belief states induced by sets
of sources S
1
and S
2
, respectively. The fusion of 	
1
and 	
2
denoted 	
1
_ 	
2
,
is the pedigreed belief state induced by S
1
[ S
2
.
We simply show the following proposition:
Proposition 4.16 Suppose that w on S is restricted to be total and let 	
1
and 	
2
be the pedigreed belief states induced by sets of sources S
1
and S
2
,
respectively. Then (	
1
_ 	
2
)
trans
= 	
1trans
5	
2trans
.
Proof. Straightforward. 2
As the above discussion, we can substitute our fusion of preferential rela-
tions for the belief fusion.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper's contribution is the following. Maynard-Reid II et al. proposed
the idea of pedigreed sources to solve the inconsistency of knowledge amalga-
mation when the renement operator is iteratively applied. However in the
theory, all the sources must be totally ordered and this fact restricts the area
of application. In this paper, we realized the partiality of preferential rela-
tions, and showed the procedure of fusion of them. In addition, we showed
that our operation can properly include the ordinary belief fusion.
In our method of fusion of preferential relations, there were still several is-
sues. First, we dened the primitive renement by a xed-point equation. Al-
though the denition was mathematically sound, we need to argue the eÆcient
procedure to compute Tr(Pr(r
a
 r
b
)) independently. Secondly, we dened
the cautious renement by the intersection of all the possible renements. Of
course, this is not an only method to uniquely decide the renement, and we
can consider other ways to select one renement among other renements.
In future, we are to study all these branches and to evaluate the adequate-
ness, considering the applicability of practical problems.
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